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The online magazine for independent conservatives, edited by Taki Theodoracopulos

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“We’re Making Progress in Iraq"--Towards What?

Progress in Iraq! Every opinion seems to turn on whether one believes that it exists. (See here, here and here.)

“Progress” (or “lack of progress") may seem like a neutral way to describe what is or isn’t happening in Iraq.  In reality it is no more than an elusive figure of speech.  By grossly simplifying what we are trying to achieve, the notion of “progress” makes it much easier to believe in the efficacy of the American occupation.

(Is it not also possible to oppose the occupation on the grounds that it is making too much “progress”? A stable, democratic Iraq may be a more attractive haven for anti-American terrorists than an anarchic Iraq.  Alas, an anarchic Iraq may create more headaches for our putative enemies in Iran.  For these reasons, it is far from clear that a stable, democratic Iraq is even a good thing.)

“Pro-gress” literally means “walking forward.” In the view of those who speak of “progress” in Iraq, then, the occupation is like a man trying to take one step at a time towards a known destination. That is to say, American forces are implementing policies that can be expected to achieve, incrementally, American goals: a legitimate, stable and recognizably democratic government that is more or less friendly to the United States.

In contrast to “progress,” consider this as a simile for the occupation: The occupation of Iraq is like a man trying to get all the squirrels in Central Park to line up in the form of a perfect circle. The image of choreographing squirrels, I submit, is much more apt than the image of “progress.”

Consider: Nobody actually knows how to get live squirrels to line up in the form of a perfect circle. It could be done, of course, in the sense that it is not physically impossible. But one would have to be extremely clever to figure out a way to do it. The training and experimentation involved would take years, if not decades. Most of the time, you would not even know whether what you are doing were even accomplishing anything.

Likewise, stable, legitimate, democratic and pro-American government could conceivably emerge in Iraq. That does not mean that we actually know how to make it happen.  As we have discovered, achieving democratic government is relatively easy. All “democracy” qua democracy requires is a set of voting mechanisms. But how to make a government (whether democratic or not) legitimate and stable is almost a complete mystery. That millions of Britons don’t give a second thought to the legitimacy of their constitution is one of the most celebrated, yet unaccountable, facts in all of politics. Merely promulgating a written “constitution” is obviously inadequate to create legitimacy, for a written constitution wont be considered legitimate unless there already exist legitimate institutions to ratify it (as existed, for example, in the form of state governments in 1787 America). Legitimacy, it could be said, does not emerge by design—it simply happens.

Nor do we know how to make the Iraqi government pro-American (as opposed to, say, pro-Iranian). Even during the Cold War, despite (one would think) the benefits of aligning with the U.S., efforts to increase the number of pro-American governments met with mixed success. Iraqi memory of American perfidies, meanwhile, could easily undermine any tendency for them to support American policy.

Finally, it is not clear that the sundry goals of the occupation are compatible with one another in the first place. It may be, for example, that Iraqis will never accept a pro-American government as legitimate. It may be that democratic voting mechanisms—which have a tendency to reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions—are incompatible with stability.  If these things are true, then the occupation of Iraq is not just like trying to get squirrels to arrange themselves in a perfect circle: it is more like trying to get them to arrange themselves in a perfect square circle, or perhaps even a perfect triangular square circle. It cannot be done.

The squirrels are not at all interested in your goal of getting them to line up in a perfect circle. The “progress” metaphor only tells you about the people who are actually working towards American goals in Iraq—such as, presumably, American troops and (if we’re lucky) some of the players in Iraq’s official Green Zone government. It ignores the millions of players in Iraq who have no interest in achieving American goals whatsoever.

Apologists for the occupation like to point out that the vast majority of Iraqis want to live in peace under a legitimate, stable government that responds to their needs. (President Bush has infamously argued that, since everyone desires freedom, freedom must therefore be inevitable, even in Iraq.) The same could probably be said of the majority of people everywhere. This truism does not mean that anyone’s behavior is actually oriented towards the goal of stable and legitimate government. Most ordinary people care no more about politics than squirrels care about marching in formation. Like squirrels, their primary concern, especially in a place like Iraq, is simply to survive. Most men and women will do whatever it takes to ensure their survival and the survival of their families, whether or not peaceful government happens to merge as a result.  Any Iraqi who forsakes the protection of a local gang or militia, for example, is a fool, whether or not his gang has any interest at any particular time in cooperating with the Americans or an American-dependent government.

As for those Iraqis that actually do care about politics, alternative forms of government probably concern them no more than they do ordinary people. Political leaders everywhere hunger for power and glory. America has the great fortune of channeling political leaders’ ambitions towards ends that are compatible with peaceful government. Iraq may not be so lucky. Political leaders in Iraq risk not just lost elections but their very lives and the lives of all those loyal to them. When the stakes are that high, compromise becomes difficult.

There’s no way of knowing whether any development is helpful or unhelpful in getting all the squirrels in Central Park to align in a perfect circle. Suppose you succeed in coaxing one squirrel to stand in place. You can call that “progress” if you wish, but your very success with that one squirrel may have cost you with some of the others. The other squirrels may be frightened of the obedient squirrel, or maybe some of them perceive in their squirrelly heads that standing in place as you wish them to do is not actually consistent with their respective interests.  To determine whether any policy you adopt is “working,” it is not enough to focus on just one squirrel at a time. You have to measure its effects on all the squirrels at once. Most of these effects are simply unknown.
Both the champions and the critics of the occupation seize on every development as proof that we are or are not making “progress” in Iraq.  Virtually every development can be viewed as either “progress” or a “setback,” given a particular set of background assumptions.  Famously, for example, the elections that some saw as a harbinger of an “Arab spring” (because they allegedly demonstrated Iraqis’ hunger for democratic government) may instead, by proving that Iraqis would (sensibly, from the point of view of survival) vote along ethnic and sectarian lines, have contributed to the orgy of violence that followed.

More trivially, apologists for the occupation once saw the rise of cell phone use a sign of “progress"—apparently on the theory that using cell phones seems very Western and therefore must be democratic. In fact, widespread demand for cell phones in places like Iraq is more like a sign of political dysfunction.

Recently, occupation apologists have argued that the drop in violence in Iraq is a sign of “progress.” Of course, all other things being equal, less violence is better than more. That does not mean, however, that reducing violence is compatible with achieving legitimate, stable and democratic government. The reduction in violence may very well have been purchased at the cost of entrenching local interests that are hostile to American goals.

Finally, just in the past several weeks, the assault on Sadr’s forces has been spun both ways. Does it prove the weakness of the central government? That powerful interests in Iraq cannot be coaxed to support the government? Or does it prove the ultimate seriousness of the official Green Zone government? You cannot interpret any data-point in Iraq without a priori assumptions as to what it shows. Since, in fact, we have no plausible theory as to how legitimate, stable, democratic and pro-American government can actually emerge, there is no way of telling whether we are making “progress” or not, no matter how many data-points we collect.

There are lots of people in and around Central Park who want to use it for their own purposes, not yours. To get all the squirrels in Central Park to align in a perfect circle, you will first need to stop outside interference. A lot of local residents, for example, may want to throw frisbees to their dogs or play softball—activities likely to affect your squirrel choreography adversely. Moreover, they are perfectly right to want to use Central Park for their own purposes and not yours. If they live in New York City and you don’t, Central Park probably means a lot more to them than it does to you.

Likewise, there are lots of nations around Iraq that have their own designs on the place. Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, for example, all might prefer different outcomes and may be willing to exert their influence in order to achieve them. Even if the United States could theoretically control events in Iraq without their interference, it still may not have much control over the behavior of neighboring countries. At any moment, Iran or Turkey could probably defeat the entire project.

Anything is possible with extreme measures. In one sense it is easy to get all the squirrels in Central Park to form a perfect circle: just kill all the squirrels and arrange their dead bodies however you please. If any pedestrians try to stop you, kill them, too.

Likewise, in Iraq, the United States could achieve its goals if it were willing to use sufficient force.  That it does not means only that the United States has other goals (like not committing genocide) that trump its professed goals in Iraq.

In sum, to avoid obfuscation, pundits should not say “we are/are not making progress in Iraq,” but rather “we are/are not making the squirrels in Iraq line up in the form of a perfect circle.” Does the “squirrels” metaphor prejudice the debate? Of course it does! The point is that it prejudices the debate no more—indeed, probably a lot less—than the metaphor of “progress.”

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