“Listening to this address, his audience must have seen that Solzhenitsyn did not understand the West at all.”

I read this address, and I came to a contrary conclusion.  He understood the West, and its problems, better than most Westerners themselves.
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/solzhenitsyn/harvard1978.html

The recent history of Eastern Europe proves this beyond any reasonable doubt.  The current system of the West, focused only on short-term profit, pushed by USA/EU, is not in any way a positive qualitative alternative to even the Soviet system.

Perhaps Mr. Hart needs to read more about WWII in Europe.  America was hardly “indispensable.” The Soviet Union defeated Germany almost single-handedly.  The UK had a very minor role, and the main effect of American participation was in seeing to it that Western Europe became free, rather than Soviet satellites.  While most certainly an important result, it had no impact on the outcome of the war.  Historians argue over the turning point of the European war.  But whether you choose the 1941-42 winter, Stalingrad, or Kursk, there is not doubt that the war had turned and the handwriting was on the wall for Germany before a single American soldier had set foot on the European mainland.

Mr. Hart, I would go a step farther than you did; but then, at the beginning of the curl of my DNA, I am a monarchist: You say that Gospodin Putin is “… in effect a modern Czar...” I have called him, and in a tone devoid of irony express or implied, “Tsar Vladimir.” I believe that a constitutional monarchy, leaving some—but not all—real power with the Monarch, might be of serious help to Russia in recovering from its lately ended seventy-four-year ordeal of possession.

Mr. Hart did not notice Solzhenitsyn’s remark that the West should have prevailed over Germany in both wars without Russian sacrifice.  Then like so many commie hating academics he overestimated the American role.  Mr. Perry attempted to enlighten him, but harsher facts are called for.

The first engagement of any consequence with Germans in World War II took place in North Africa in February 1943, some 14 months after the start of war for the United States.  American II Corps was under the command of Major General Fredenall, the personal choice of General Marshall, and his superior was General Dwight David Eisenhower.  In eight days more than 3000 Americans were killed or wounded, 3700 were listed as missing in action and over 200 tanks were lost at the battle of Kasserine Pass.  The soldiers listed as missing in action were mostly taken prisoner, but as a reference the number was greater than the total listed as missing in action by American forces for eight years of the Vietnam War.  The German Army under General Rommel had losses under 1000 in killed, wounded or missing and a loss of 20 tanks.  On January 31, 1943 92,000 Germans had started surrendering at Stalingrad.  Included among the surrendering Germans were 24 generals and newly promoted Field Marshal von Paulus.  The great turning point in the war in Europe had occurred before American troops had fought one battle.

The way this humiliating thumping of the American army by the Germans was interpreted by Americans and British, then and now, has provoked interesting comment to this day.  British General Alexander, after arriving from Cairo at the height of the fighting and after American leaders blew it, took command of the battle.  After the battle was over, Alexander recommended the relief of Fredenall with the best American corps commander available.  At first Eisenhower offered this post to Mark Clark, who declined as he thought it would appear as a demotion from his job as a tentative Army commander, and then to George Patton who accepted.  As ever public appearances were very important to the American military.  To deflect anticipated criticism Major General Fredenall was promoted to Lieutenant General and sent home to the United States with a training command.  What Fredenall was going to instill in troops undergoing training in the United States was not made clear.

At this stage in the war British Generals Alexander and Montgomery were more than a little concerned with the direction the war would be taking.  Both Alexander and Montgomery had extensive service in the trenches of World War I, and Eisenhower had none.  Eisenhower had not left the United States, and the rest of the American generals, to include Patton, had very little when compared to the British.  American historian, Stephen Ambrose, thought an argument could be made that not having been in combat in World War I may have been an advantage in conducting the next war.  Ambrose thought setting up and running training camps, creating time tables and supervising training schedule for thousands of men in the United States would have enabled Eisenhower to avoid the caution of the British who remembered the blood of the battles of the Somme and Flanders.  In addition Ambrose astutely pointed out that if Eisenhower had shipped out to Europe in 1917 he would not have had extensive, broadening experience with civilians, but that his time at war would have been confined to the professional military.  Mr. Ambrose wrote that Eisenhower’s military experience in World War I was excellent preparation for leadership in World War II.  Such has been the viewpoint of much of American academia who write on war.

The British were apoplectic over Kasserine.  Alexander had cabled Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with a note for Churchill’s eye: “...My main anxiety is the poor fighting quality of the Americans” and later in a further letter to Alanbrooke: “...I have only the American II Corps.  There are millions of them elsewhere who must be living in a fool’s paradise.  If this handful of divisions here are their best, the value of the remainder of the rest may be imagined”.

Eisenhower radioed Marshall that American troops were going to come out more battlewise and tactically efficient.  British commanders recommended American training methods be abandoned and replaced by British.  Eisenhower did ask that experienced British combat officers be assigned to American divisions.  George Marshall in an off-the-record interview remembered Alexander’s bitterness and his belief that American infantry could never be used effectively against the Germans.  Commenting on the battle in a biography of Kasserine.  Alexander had cabled Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with a note for Churchill’s eye: “...My main anxiety is the poor fighting quality of the Americans” and later in a further letter to Alanbrooke: “...I have only the American II Corps.  There are millions of them elsewhere who must be living in a fool’s paradise.  If this handful of divisions here are their best, the value of the remainder of the rest may be imagined”.  Churchill to the end of the war had doubts about the “battleworthiness” of the American army.

Eisenhower radioed Marshall that American troops were going to come out more battlewise and tactically efficient.  British commanders recommended American training methods be abandoned and replaced by British.  Eisenhower did ask that experienced British combat officers be assigned to American divisions.  George Marshall in an off-the-record interview remembered Alexander’s bitterness and his belief that American infantry could never be used effectively against the Germans.  Commenting on the battle in a biography of Eisenhower published in 1983, the historian Ambrose regarded the battle in the tactical sense as a victory for Rommel, but denied any strategic gain for the Germans.  In the approved manner of optimistic American historians Ambrose qualified his assessment to add Eisenhower may have been done a favor in preparing Americans for subsequent battle.  However, his overall judgment of Ike’s performance in his first major battle was “miserable”.  Almost 10 years later in common with many newspapers the Philadelphia Inquirer ran stories commemorating the 50th anniversaries of important events of World War II.  For the invasion of North Africa the Inquirer asked Ambrose about American performance, and Ambrose replied: “At Kasserine Pass we took a pretty good licking for two days, and we started to dig in.  Eisenhower made the comment that the American soldier doesn’t like to be pushed around.  In the end, I think it was a victory”.  Did Mr. Ambrose lecture at Rotary Clubs and women literary clubs for the nine years between the book publishing date and the newspaper article?  Mr. Ambrose must have learned the great audiences in America demanded this balderdash for mental stimulation and a feel-good mood.

Of great interest was the observation of Omar Bradley, who was Eisenhower’s classmate at West Point and favorite.  Bradley commented that “Ike led an extraordinarily charmed life”, and he thought the British who had elevated Ike into the stratosphere at Casablanca and brought Alexander into his command were trapped by their precipitous action.  Bradley professionally critiqued the campaign: “I feel certain that after Kasserine Pass he (Eisenhower) would have been fired.  Ike was a political general of rare and valuable gifts, but as his African record clearly demonstrates, he did not know how to manage a battlefield”.  He uttered this almost 40 years after the battle.  Bradley thought of Alexander as the outstanding General’s General of the European war with his shrewd tactical judgment and his ability to bear the nationally minded and jealous Allied commanders of his command.  In each successive Mediterranean campaign he won the adulation of his American subordinates.

Years later writing largely about another war in another time and another place, a young William Westmoreland, not seven years out of West Point and serving as an artillery commander in the Ninth Division, would refer only to American troops having “fallen back under impact” from the onslaught of Rommel’s forces.  Refusal to accept brutal facts and publicly acknowledge them was probably learned in North Africa by the former First Captain of West Point.

Perhaps it is too cruel to remember that on April 1, 1942 Secretary of War Stimson and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall presented President Roosevelt with a plan for the cross channel invasion of northern France in 1942 by American and British forces.  This plan had been crafted by newly promoted head of Operations Division, Major General Dwight Eisenhower.  The British Army of over 200,000 men had been kicked out of France in June of 1940.  The New York Times celebrated the Fourth of July of 1940 with an editorial by stating the veterans of the British Army were chafing to have “another go” at the Germans.  Seemingly it did not occur to that newspaper that the soldiers of that army were only too happy to have escaped with their lives.  The memory of being chased by Panzers still caused fright among most of the tommies.  These men needed time to regain their nerve and forget the fearsome Germans. The men owed their lives to the dunderhead decision by Adolf Hitler to halt his tanks.  Hitler mistakenly believed the Luftwaffe could finish off the British.  The wary British contemplated the proposed invasion plan of the four American amateurs and the sacrifice of six divisions with only two being American.  The storming of northwest Europe that had 30 or 40 German divisions probably would have resulted in the annihilation of the American army and an armistice.

Mr. Hart and his colleagues at National Review have long been cheerleaders with little sense of what war was like.  The fighting of wars is to be left to others.

Yes, it certainly is the “Cuban Missile Crisis” all over again and leave it to this new generation of multi-ethnic great crusading internationalists at the NRO to form the tonga line and start chanting “Push....push....push the button now”.

Let us parry the West’s NATO transgressions in Georgia .... prudently rebuked by Europe.... with talk about bombers in Cuba but by no means utter the provocation of 1,000 American Troops joining in war games in Georgia a scant 3 weeks before the Russians lost patience. With this gleefully resurrected chapter of the Cold War, it will be a real boon to the Military Industrial Complex.

This time though, the War Industrialists on both sides know enough to not let Nuclear war ruin their profit stream and so we shall see all manner of conventional warfare break out amongst the nation states. War is, of course the Nation State’s vitamins and mothers milk and the Neo Con press are the Tetaires, priming the pump to insure the flow.

Nuclear Arms have proved themselves to be a Godsend to the Militarists, making conventional warfare seem somehow harmless and altogether acceptable....a kind of sheepish relief prevails and we only have to worry about the crazy Arab Sheik putting it off track by an importunate use of nuclear arms. Conventional wars will occupy him well enough.

The Irony of Mr. Solzhenitsyn’s extended stay amongst the Home Rule Vermonters is that he most certainly did understand the emerging America...in effect, a resounding rebuke to the original America..... that the natives were hell bent on pursuing.

At some point, the editors of this site might recognize that their recent fixation upon the various authoritarian cheer leaders of the NRO is a tad odd and use any mention of what goes on over there as fodder in the humor mill rather than publishing their heartfelt paeans to illogic. You see, they have been trained in a form of public intellectualism that was only revealed as a result of its’ clumsy use by the former Attorney General during a presentation at the American Enterprise Institute. Former Atty. General. Gonzales began his presentation by extolling the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution. In his cheery summation, all present swooned with delight in a romantic immersion within the lovely precincts of original intent. All the Boxes were Checked in a tour de force of Leave No Child Behind Bureaucratese . Then, when all had been softened up, he tartly informed the assembled that neither the Senate nor the Judiciary were suited or equipped to render judgement on the enemy combatants or other terror issues because they did not possess the “intelligence resources of the Office of the Executive”. Though this assertion is funny on so many levels, what was funniest is that the rubes at the American Enterprise Institute awarded this statement with hearty applause.

Solzhy saw it all to clearly because he lived it in the Gulag.

Re: Mr Perry’s and others’ comments, even Ludwig von Mises said in 1944 that Stalingrad was not the turning point or most important battle of the war; that laurel was worn by the Battle of the North Atlantic.

Without the British Navy’s early efforts, later joined by us in safeguarding convoys of supplies to Murmansk and other Baltic ports, Russia’s logistical problems would have been insurmountable, most likely leading to stalemate. Would Stalin have had the supplies for the Stalingrad effort, and without America’s efforts in the Pacific occupying the Japanese, would he have risked the manpower deployment to such an extent?

We will never know for sure because history cannot be rewound; but, easy assumptions that the war could only turn out right with Stalingrad a Russian victory is fanciful. Victory for the Germans there might have drawn them even further into the Asian vastness and become a classic case of imperial overstretch.

This game can be played endlessly; but from Alexander to today, the logistical realities trump everything else.

Quoting Ludwig von Mises on World War II and the North Atlantic reveals much of American ignorance.  Stalin told Harry Hopkins before America entered the war that Russia could be supplied across the north Pacific.  Under terms of their peace treaty with Japan non-military items could be shipped to Vladivostok.  This is what happened.

The Germans protested bitterly, but the Japanese allowed reflagged freighters to sail to Vladivostok.  Saburo Hayashi, former Japanese military attaché in Moscow, estimated that several million tons were shipped in the last year of the war.  The cargo had long been primarily military, and the Soviets would not permit the Japanese to inspect.  To no avail the Germans continued to protest.  The Japanese remembered the beating Zhukov gave them at Nomonhan.  The run to Murmansk has assumed mythic status in western folklore.

The British were rightfully concerned with the tactical superiority of the German army; however, an army cannot be defeated unless it is engaged. The defeat at Kasserine Pass was a minor affair in context and to be expected with a green army facing a veteran force. The American recipe for victory against the formidable German army actually worked: crushing use of tactical air forces and artillery in combined assault with mobile ground forces overcoming the German advantage in infantry and armored forces. Throw in a massive and successful deception campaign (and German mistakes)and you have Overlord.