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Entry: Life Beyond the Party Link: http://www.takimag.com/site/article/life_beyond_the_party#21256 Post contents: <i>Ponnuru’s response in “Afterparty” is to concede that this argument “would work if abortion were a mere eviction from the womb. But the death of the fetus is in nearly every real case the goal of an abortion…” The rights-logic of Ponnuru’s own argument, though, only takes him this far: the fetus should not be actively destroyed, but may be evicted from the womb—which, for fetuses prior to the age of viability, amounts to a death sentence. Ponnuru does not follow his own logic to that conclusion, because that is not the conclusion he wishes to reach. But it is where his argument leads. Murray Rothbard’s philosophical continuator Walter Block has explored this avenue thoroughly, reaching the conclusion that eviction is consistent with natural rights, even if deliberate destruction is not. Whether the fetus can survive eviction is immaterial, according to this line of thinking.</i> If the object of an action is what the agent intends to bring about by that action, then choosing to "evict" a non-viable fetus from the womb rather than waiting until it is viable amounts to intentionally taking the life of an innocent human being. The "directness" of the killing concerns the intention of the agent, and not the particular sequence of actions that results in the fetus's death. Ponnuru is on solid ground to claim that, while a woman has a right to determine what happens in and to her body, no one has a right to <i>directly</i> cause the death of an innocent human being. Rothbard's response relies on a libertarian notion of rights that considers the body to be private property which includes the absolute right to exclude others from it. Ponnuru's critics also assume that the morality of an action is detemined by its consequences rather than the intention of the agent. That is presupposed by this comment: <i>Murray Rothbard’s philosophical continuator Walter Block has explored this avenue thoroughly, reaching the conclusion that eviction is consistent with natural rights, even if deliberate destruction is not. Whether the fetus can survive eviction is immaterial, according to this line of thinking.</i> But it's not immaterial on the view I am describing since inentionally choosing to "evict" a non-viable fetus rather than a viable one is to choose to bring about the death of an innocent human being. Not all "evictions" are the same. It is quite plausible to think that someone who knowingly chooses to "evict" a fetus under circumstances that will result in the fetus's death when this is not necessary is choosing to do something evil. We are talking about the objective wrongness of the action, not the subjective culpability of the person involved. I have not read Ponnuru's argument, but many capable authors have provided a consistent natural law theory of rights that provide an account of the immorality of abortion. These accounts do not fall prey to the criticisms of Rothbard. They also do not fall prey to the absurd criticism that <i>"the same rights-logic can be applied to children after they are born as well: they have no “right” to exist in their parents homes and can be evicted at will, again regardless of what will happen to them as a result"</i>. This is true only on the ridiculous libertarian theory of rights that is here treating children like property rather than persons. As usual, libertarian theories of rights have no room for the weak and dependent. We have to locate the natural rights of the child here within thoe overall context of the purpose of human existence, marriage, sex, etc. Perhaps filling out these details would make the account less "abstract". Sent at: 2008 08 21