Taki Magazine

Oil and the American Nightmare

by Grant Havers on May 19, 2009

Much as I enjoy reading the thoughtful reflections of Messrs. Gordon and Spencer on Andrew Bacevich’s recent study of the role of oil in American foreign policy, I must admit to a general sympathy with Bacevich’s analysis.  The American control of oil has tended to require a strong military presence in the Middle East at least since 1973, despite David Gordon’s objection to Bacevich’s emphasis on this matter of empire (which I quote as follows): 

Bacevich may deplore ‘conspicuous consumption,’ but his Veblenesque theory does not account for our bellicose foreign policy. If the American economy requires oil, there is no need to use military measures to secure it. Countries with oil have every incentive to trade with us. Hostile countries are no exception.

It seems a bit far-reaching to assume that all countries with oil, friendly or hostile, have an incentive to trade their black gold with America, or at least on terms that American consumers as well as elites could tolerate for long.  The worst possible terms, from an American perspective, would be the unity of Arab nations coupled with total control of the oil supply.  (This unity was nearly attained during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.)  As political scientist Chris Vasillopulos puts it:

If the Arabs could unite sufficiently to use oil as a political weapon, they would be able to shape the Middle East according to their own values and interests. Whether this outcome would follow the model of Islamic republics or secular democracies is not the critical issue for realists. Arab unity and its capacity to politicize oil is [sic] the American nightmare. This is the real weapon of mass destruction in the Middle East. Few observers have understood this reason for America’s support of Israel. This vision of politicized oil has seemed blurred, even to the usually clear-eyed, due to a divergence between Israel and the US regarding the way to prevent Arab unity. Generally speaking, the US has favored political and geographical stability in the region. The first Gulf War was fought to prevent Iraq from becoming a regional hegemon with regard to oil. From this viewpoint, the Bush-Cheney neoconservative invasion of Iraq was a mistake because it destabilized the region. Although realists are sincere in their desire for stability in the Middle East, they do not want stability to result in Arab unity regarding oil policy. To prevent the politicization of oil, these policy makers will risk instability. Hence, they support Israeli aggression and the resistance it provokes to the degree this keeps the Middle East in turmoil.  (Today’s Zaman, January 17, 2009). 

I would only add that there is plenty of evidence that postwar elites in the United States have usually preferred to deal with oil-producing nations whose leaders are at a political disadvantage.  In the case of the Middle East, the local autocrats need the protection of the American military against the forces of Arab unity, whether these are democratic or fundamentalist Islamic in nature.  From an American “realist” perspective, the instability that results from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is partly a bonus, since it stokes the fires of Islamic terrorism throughout the region.  As long as the royals in Saudi Arabia fear the rise of a pan-Arab unity based on radical Islam (which, sad to say, is somewhat more likely than a unity based on liberal democratic aspirations), they are reluctantly willing to support a strong American military presence in the Middle East.  The status quo of staying in power, albeit with the support of American weaponry, seems a tad preferable to decapitation at the hands of vindictive fundamentalist cadres. 

Of course, this scenario is a vicious circle.  The greater the involvement of US soldiers in this region, the greater the likelihood of Islamic terrorism.  Yet the recurrent benefit, at least to the American consumer, is relatively easy access to affordable oil and the indefinite postponement of that nightmarish prospect:  losing control of all that black gold to jihadists who seek to impose a different kind of stability on the Middle East. 

(Please note that I am not offering a moral defense of this foreign policy based on control of Middle Eastern oil; I am only adhering to the “Dragnet” approach to brute empirical fact.) 

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