Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said he believed that Egypt was incapable of mounting an attack to win back the Sinai Peninsula, and he supported Israel’s policy of refusing to negotiate its complete return. On the eve of Egypt’s invasion of the Sinai on October 6 1973, Kissinger asked for intelligence on the possibility of an Egyptian attack. As the war was ending on October 23, he told his staff he had requested

“€œ…intelligence estimates, producing a massive row between CIA and INR [State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research] as to who was entitled to produce intelligence estimates for the Secretary. We got one estimate for the Secretary and one for the Assistant to the President. Both of which, however, agreed on the proposition that an Arab attack was highly improbable. These intelligence reports were confirmed during the week. And indeed the morning of the attack, the President’s daily brief, intelligence brief, still pointed out there was no possibility of an attack.”€

When the attack came, returning Sinai to Egypt at last became possible. Kissinger, however, delayed this as long as he could”€”as he did a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and all its neighbors that should have come out of the 1973 war and would have made it the last.

In 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat shocked Washington with his offer to visit Jerusalem and negotiate directly with Israel. A few years later, American diplomats in Cairo were telling journalists such as me that the Army was wholly loyal to Sadat. On October 6 1981, while Sadat celebrated his “€œassault on the Suez Canal”€ at a Cairo parade, members of his Army shot him dead. The US oversaw the transition to his successor, an Egyptian Air Force general named Hosni Mubarak.

Mubarak acquired the same affection for money and power’s trappings that Sadat did, encouraging his family and friends to treat Egypt’s wealth and American aid as if both were their own. Riots came and went over such trifles as the price of bread and gasoline, as they had under Sadat. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak started grooming his son to succeed him. The US seemed untroubled by this until recently, when it opened lines to those in Egypt’s opposition who were willing to speak to American diplomats and spies. Too late.

Even though it directly followed Tunisia’s successful rebellion, the size of Egyptian public opposition to Mubarak took the US by surprise. Washington is not coping well with whatever change is coming, and it may have no more influence over it than it did in Iran in 1979 or Russia a dozen years later.

This may be a good thing for the Egyptians, but the American Mideast policy is a shambles. I wish Professor Ibish had lived to see it.